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New Vistas Havelock Ross-Brewster Assessment Age 21 is not a time for contemplating death. But that’s the way it is. CARICOM has not amounted to much in terms of production and trade. Its functional tasks are a classic example of ‘spill-around’ - a proliferation of low-politic cooperation activities convenient to governments that can decide neither to go forward nor backward. Foreign policy coordination has been a non-starter. CARICOM’s economic tasks
have been overtaken by events (though they were justifiable at the time of
its formation). Economic policy of the individual States, as well as
recent decisions made by the Conference of CARICOM Heads of Government,
reflect a free market stance on integration into the world economy, itself
now more open than before. It is represented by the stabilization and
adjustment programmes that have been adopted, adherence to the principles
of the (expanded) GATT/WTO, the establishment of the ACS, trade
liberalization agreements with several Latin American countries, the keen
interest on the part of some CARICOM States to join NAFTA, and the
commitment that all of them have to participate in the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. CARICOM, as an economic
integration strategy, has failed because it was always a second-best
solution, predicated on the acceptance, out of necessity, of substantial
protectionist costs and the implementation of effective compensatory
mechanisms for maldistributed costs and benefits. In any event, individual
States have always been prepared to defect, indeed if not in word, for
second-best arrangements, while the reality of uneven costs and benefits
has served to curtail the deepening of integrationist ventures.
Neofunctionalism also has failed because the strategy lacked coherence and
premeditated design on the part of the Community’s bureaucracy and
because it was always seen as ceding some of the fruits of State
sovereignty for gains that were negligible. Rationale It is thus time to return
to the sources, to the ‘first-best’, to the truly authentic rationale
for Caribbean integration. Regrettably, the West Indian Commission (1992)
missed this opportunity. It sought to avoid commitment in the foreseeable
future to political integration, and instead, advocated perfection of the
economic integration instruments of CARICOM. It attempted to straddle
three stools at the same time -West Indian integration, Caribbean
regional-wide integration and global integration - and ended up by falling
between them. No cogent new directions are discernible in this heavily
compromised schema. This is regrettable because, in confining its sights
to conventional notions of political integration (parliamentary union) and
economic integration (single market) it has not only preserved a false
dichotomy between them, but precluded consideration of more creative and
fruitful options. Future Developments along these lines will also ultimately strengthen CARICOM’s relations with the non-anglophone Caribbean, Central America and the rest of Latin America. For a pre-requisite for reaching out, especially to neighbours that are so culturally and geographically cohesive, will be the enhancement of the CARICOM people’s cultural identity, self-knowledge and self-confidence. The economic/functional dimension of the Union would revolve in the future also around activities that are inherently of the first-best. These are activities that are better pursued regionally than internationally or nationally. They will be activities that are unique or least-cost or for which there are no alternative options. The latter are activities that necessarily require regional solutions, such as in respect of regional commons, regional public goods and regional resource complementarity. Regional commons are commonly shared goods or ‘bads’, such as the sea, airspace, the weather, disease, pest infestation. Regional public goods are goods and services which if not provided regionally would not be provided at all, such as regional security, regional social infrastructure like high technology and advanced scientific training and medical facilities, regional physical infrastructure like sea and air transportation and telecommunications. And, regional resource complementarity are combinations of resources that are unlikely to be exploited other than through regional arrangements, such as food demand/arable land, mineral smelting/hydro-electricity, and diversified financial services. The Community’s economic/functional institutions of the future would therefore be phased out of their present preoccupation with, for example, managing the various instruments that constitute and support the Common Market, and instead should be devoted to: energizing the private sector for its role in region-wide enterprise development; identifying and promoting the development of those truly first-best regional activities, including regional infrastructure and regional services; and supporting member governments by organizing regular, research-based consultations on macro-economic and national and regional policy assessments and outlook analyses. Finally, in regard to production and trade, activities that do not meet the test of the first-best on a regional scale would be left in the future to market forces, to the dictates of international comparative advantage. This policy would, however, allow for reasonable adjustment periods for critical industries, especially agriculture, that cannot immediately compete internationally, and of course, for a genuine determination that international trading partners are not themselves using protectionist subsidies and other unfair trading practices. Since individual CARICOM States are progressively moving in this direction, albeit at different rates, some more quickly and comprehensively than others, it would make sense to recognize this reality at the CARICOM level as well. It serves no good purpose to pretend that intra-CARICOM production and trade are being developed under the impetus of Community regimes such as the Common External Tariff, among others, that neither confer common protection or are effective in promoting resource-based industries and trade within the region. An approach along these lines would introduce a good deal more realism and flexibility into the increasingly complex situation in which CARICOM finds itself, with overlapping and inconsistent subregional, hemispheric and world commitment, and defacto defections by the individual States. How to proceed is now the
question. The political leadership should show the way. Does it have a
vision for CARICOM that is anything more than a meeting-place for
functional cooperation? Can the regional bureaucracy itself orchestrate a
truly deepening process, politicians notwithstanding, a la Jacques Delors.
At any rate, the past and the future are now in collision. And it could
mean death, or a new birth. [This contribution summarizes the author’s ideas on the future of CARICOM that have been published in a series of articles over the last two years].
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